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CRIMINAL LAW-TERR Y SEARCHES
PREDICATED ON NOTHING MORE THAN
REASONABLE SUSPICION THAT A SUSPECT IS
ARMED AND DANGEROUS-UNITED STATES V
HOUSE, 463 F. APP'X 783 (10TH CIR. 2012)
In order to conduct a search or seizure of a person in the United
States, the general rule is that law enforcement officers must first obtain a
warrant.' The Supreme Court has, however, recognized several exceptions
to this rule, one of which allows an officer to conduct a limited pat-frisk of
a person based on the officer's reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is
afoot and the suspect is armed and dangerous-the "Terry doctrine.", 2 In
United States v. House,3 the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit had the opportunity to consider whether an officer engaged in a
consensual encounter with a suspect must have reasonable suspicion that4
criminal activity is afoot as a prerequisite to conducting a Terry pat-frisk.
The majority opinion mistakenly decided not to address this issue, deciding
the case instead on the grounds that the pat-frisk was unjustified because
the officer lacked reasonable suspicion that the suspect was armed and
dangerous.'
On the afternoon of November 20, 2009, Officer Aaron Daley
visited a home to investigate a call concerning noises coming from a
woman's basement. 6
Upon completing a brief investigation and
I

See U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons ...

against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause ......
");see also Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978) ("The Fourth
Amendment proscribes all unreasonable searches and seizures, and it is a cardinal principle that
'searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate,
are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment ....' (quoting Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 357 (1967))). The Court has stated that the primary purpose of the Fourth Amendment
"is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by
governmental officials." Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967) (noting Fourth
Amendment provides right that is "basic to a free society" (quoting Wolf v. Colorado, 388 U.S.
25, 27 (1949))).
2 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968) (creating reasonable suspicion exception to
warrant requirement).
3 463 F. App'x 783 (10th Cir. 2012).
4 See id. at 787 (noting issue presented whether reasonable suspicion of criminal activity
necessary to support Terry frisk).
5 See id. (declining to decide whether officer may frisk suspect during consensual encounter).
6 House, 463 F. App'x at 784.
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concluding that no one had entered the woman's home, Officer Daley left
the residence. 7 As he was walking to his car, he noticed the defendant,
Joseph Paul House ("House"), walking on the sidewalk in the direction of
the woman's home.8 Simultaneously, Officer Daley noticed that as another
patrol car approached the intersection where House was walking, House
did an "immediate turnaround." 9
Suspicion aroused, Officer Daley
followed and approached House at another intersection. 10
Upon catching up to House, who was still walking on the sidewalk,
Officer Daley asked, "[H]ey, can I talk to you, hey, can I ask you a few
questions?"" House, who had been talking on his cell phone, ended his
call and turned around to face Officer Daley. 12 As House turned around,
Officer Daley noticed a large bulge in House's left coat pocket and the end
of a folding knife protruding from his right coat pocket."3 Officer Daley
asked House if he had any weapons on his person, and House replied that
he did not. 14 Officer Daley subsequently instructed House to place his
hands behind his back and removed the knife from House's pocket. 15 Upon
securing the knife, Officer Daley conducted a Terry frisk of House in
"highly probable [areas] for weapons," ultimately removing a gun from
House's other pocket.16
House was arrested and charged with being a felon in possession of
a firearm. 17 Prior to trial, House moved to suppress the evidence of the
gun, arguing that he was unlawfully detained and searched.' 8 The district
court denied his motion, reasoning that the encounter was consensual and

7 Id.
8 Id.
9 Id.

10 House, 463 F. App'x at 784.
11 Id. (describing officer's initial contact with House).
12 See United States v. House, No. 2:10-CR-007, 2010 WL 4103548, at *2 (D. Utah Oct. 18,
2010) (stating House stayed to answer questions despite feeling free to leave), overruled by 463
F. App'x 783 (10th Cir. 2012). According to House's testimony, he answered the officer's
questions because it was "the right thing to do." Id.
13 House, 463 F. App'x at 784-85.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 785.
16 Id. (alteration in original); see also infra note 34 and accompanying
text (explaining Terry
pat-frisks).

17 See House, 463 F. App'x at 784 (stating House entered conditional guilty plea pursuant
to
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)). The statute provides, "It
shall be unlawful for any person who has been
convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year...
to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any
firearm or ammunition .... 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2012).
18See House, 2010 WL 4103548, at *5-*6 (arguing gun should be suppressed because search

was unlawful).

2013]

UNITED STATES V HOUSE

the officer was therefore entitled to pat-frisk for his own safety. 19 House
subsequently entered a conditional plea of guilty, and the court sentenced
him to thirty-nine months imprisonment and three years supervised release
for his offense.20 House appealed the district court's ruling not to suppress
the evidence of the gun, arguing that the encounter was not consensual and
that Officer Daley could not lawfully frisk him because he lacked
reasonable suspicion that House was engaged in criminal activity.2 '

The

Tenth Circuit rejected House's first point and opted not to address his
second argument, but nevertheless reversed the district court's ruling
because Officer Daley lacked reasonable suspicion to suspect that House
was dangerous. 22
The Fourth Amendment consists of two independent clauses-the
Reasonableness Clause and the Warrant Clause. 3 Determining how the
19 See id. at *6

(justifying pat-frisk as necessary to ensure officer's safety). The district court

rejected House's assertion that he had been unlawfully detained, finding instead that the
encounter was consensual. Id. at *5. The court explained that not all citizen-police encounters
qualify as seizures, citing Supreme Court decisions to support its conclusion. Id. at *3; see also
infra note 23 and accompanying text (defining seizures). Having found the encounter consensual,
the district court cited Tenth Circuit precedent allowing frisks for officer safety. See House, 2010
WL 4103548, at *5 (providing officer may conduct pat-down if he harbors reasonable suspicion
person is armed and dangerous (citing United States v. Manjarrez, 348 F.3d 881, 886 (10th Cir.
2003))). Upon ruling that pat-downs during consensual encounters were constitutional, the
district court then found that Officer Daley was warranted in fearing that House was armed and
dangerous. See id. at *5-*6 (holding Officer Daley reasonably harbored concerns for his safety).
The court cited to Daley's experience as a police officer and House's vicinity to the alleged crime
scene, his evasiveness toward officers, the noticeable weapons in one pocket, and the bulge in the
other pocket to support the conclusion that Officer Daley's fear was warranted. Id.
20 House, 463 F. App'x at 784.
21 Appellant's Reply Brief at 1-6, United States v. House, 463 F. App'x 783 (10th Cir. 2012)
(No. 11-4102), 2011 WL 5320845, at *1-*6.
22 See House, 463 F. App'xi at 785-90 (stating encounter consensual but House's possession
of knife did not create threat to officer). In rejecting the State's argument that Officer Daley
reasonably believed House to be armed and dangerous, the court stated that being armed does not
necessarily equate with being dangerous. Id. at 790. The court assumed, without deciding, that a
frisk could be proper solely based on a finding that the individual was armed and dangerous, sidestepping House's main argument that frisks pursuant to consensual encounters are per se
impermissible. Id. at 786-87.
23 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."). The
threshold inquiry with all Fourth Amendment issues is to determine whether a given
governmental action constitutes a "search" or "seizure." See Brett Andrew Harvey, Minnesota v.
Dickerson and the Plain Touch Doctrine: A Proposalto Preserve Fourth Amendment Liberties
DuringInvestigatory Stops, 58 ALB. L. REV. 871, 873-74 (1995) (explaining nature of Fourth
Amendment searches). A Fourth Amendment search occurs when government agents intrude
upon an area in which an individual has asserted a legitimate expectation of privacy. See Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967) (articulating modern-day interpretation of Fourth
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two clauses interrelate is a difficult task, and one with which the Supreme
Court has struggled, because to decide the clauses' proper relationship is to
decide the values and purposes of the amendment.24 Traditionally, the
Court reconciled the two clauses by indicating that the latter clause gave
meaning to the former: that is, searches and seizures were reasonable when
conducted pursuant to judicially authorized warrants supported by probable

cause. 25

Only in extreme circumstances where exigencies made it

impracticable for officers to obtain a warrant did the Court allow for

warrantless searches and seizures in the name of reasonableness, and even
then, the Court always required that officers have probable cause. 26 The
Court's general warrant requirement supported by probable cause lent the

Amendment search). A person is seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when, by
means of physical force or show of authority, his freedom of movement is restrained, and in the
circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would believe that he was not free to
leave. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991) (explaining seizure does not occur
simply because officer approaches individual and asks questions); United States v. Mendenhall,
446 U.S. 544, 553-54 (1980) (defining seizures of persons). Once an action is determined to
constitute either a search or seizure, the question becomes whether the search or seizure was
reasonable, for "what the Constitution forbids is not all searches and seizures, but unreasonable
searches and seizures." Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960); see also Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949) (observing arbitrary intrusions upon personal privacy
unreasonable and violate concept of ordered liberty), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961).
24 See Scott E. Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mischief of
Camara and Terry, 72 MINN. L. REV. 383, 384 (1988) ("Although the challenge of reconciling
the warrant and reasonableness clauses appears elementary, the Court's inability to meet the
challenge is understandable considering that the task goes to the very core of the amendment's
meaning and purpose.").
25 See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978) (observing "cardinal principle" that
searches conducted outside judicial process are per se unreasonable); see also Mancusi v.
DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 370-71 (1968) (holding unconstitutional warrantless search of office
absent warrant even where subpoena obtained); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951)
(stating warrant requirement too frequently ignored); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 1314 (1948) (justifying warrant requirement); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33 (1925)
(stating warrantless search of home invalid under Fourth Amendment). The Johnson Court
maintained that the warrant requirement existed to ensure that a "neutral and detached magistrate"
determined when "the right of privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search," rather than
allowing such a decision to be made by "officer[s] engaged in the often competitive enterprise of
ferreting out crime." Johnson, 333 U.S. at 13-14.
26 See Sundby, supra note 24, at 386-87 (indicating reasonableness only sometimes
necessitated making warrant exception); see also Afincey, 437 U.S. at 393-94 (recognizing
exigencies may make warrant unnecessary); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99 (1967)
(allowing warrantless search by officer in hot pursuit); Jeffers, 342 U.S. at 51 (positing lack of
warrant may be excused under exceptional circumstances). Officers conducting warrantless
searches pursuant to exigent circumstances still needed probable cause to believe that they would
find evidence in the place they were looking. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 47980 (1963) (noting warrantless search required probable cause); United States v. Walsh, 299 F.3d
729, 733 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding warrantless search justified by exigent circumstances and
probable cause).
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amendment a high amount of predictability and gave greater protection to
individual privacy.27 In 1967, however, the Court laid the seeds for change
in Camara v. Municipal Court,28 holding that reasonableness, which was

met when governmental need to conduct housing inspections outweighed
individual privacy interests,
satisfied the probable cause element of the
29
requirement.
warrant
One year later in Terry v. Ohio,30 the Supreme Court pushed the
reasonableness clause further to the forefront of Fourth Amendment
analysis, proclaiming that a non-emergency search and seizure did not
require a warrant so long as it was reasonable.3 The facts of Terry were
rather unremarkable given the magnitude of the Court's holding: a veteran
Cleveland police officer observed several men on a street corner whom he
suspected to be casing a jewelry store in preparation for an attempted
robbery.3 2 Although the officer's suspicion did not quite rise to the level of
27

See Sundby, supra note 24, at 388 (stating Court's "focus on warrant clause yielded

predictability and strong protections"); see also Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 (reiterating per se rule that
warrantless searches are prohibited). The Court has justified the warrant requirement by stating
that it protects the right to privacy by assuring "an objective determination whether an intrusion is
justified in any given case." Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 621-22 (1989).
28 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
29 See id. at 537-39 (analyzing constitutionality of housing inspection under probable cause
as defined by reasonableness). At issue in Camara was a routine governmental housing
inspection of the physical condition of a private property. Id. at 525 (noting petitioner brought
action after being charged for not allowing warrantless inspection of his home). The first issue
the Court had to decide was whether such searches were subject to the traditional warrant and
probable cause requirement. Id. at 533 ("We simply cannot say that the protections provided by
the warrant procedure are not needed in this context .... "). Having elected to analyze the case
pursuant to the warrant requirement, the Court was still faced with the dilemma of how the
housing inspections could be upheld, since the probable cause requirement was not met. See
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925) (defining probable cause as facts sufficient to
warrant man of reasonable caution that offense committed); Sundby, supra note 24, at 392-93
(noting probable cause, as previously defined, not met in Camara). To satisfy the probable cause
requirement, the Court simply engrafted a new meaning onto probable cause, positing that
probable cause was met where the governmental interest in conducting housing inspections
outweighed the individual's interest in privacy. See Camara, 387 U.S. at 534-35 (defining
probable cause in terms of reasonableness).
30 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
31 Id. at 20 ([W]e deal here with an entire rubric of police conduct
necessarily swift action
predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer on the beat which historically has
not been, and as a practical matter could not be, subjected to the warrant procedure."). The Court
then explicitly stated that "the conduct involved in this case must be tested by the Fourth
Amendment's general proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures." Id.
32 See id. at 5-6 (stating police detective observed two men alternately walk back and forth
past several retail stores). The men paused to examine a particular store window with each pass,
and after each walk-by, they would meet at the street corner and confer. Id. at 6. The two men
repeated their routine approximately twelve times, interrupted once by a third man with whom
they had a brief conversation. Id. After observing this behavior, the detective became suspicious
that criminal activity was unfolding. Id.
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probable cause, he felt compelled to intervene; so he stopped the men, patfrisked each man for weapons, and recovered a pistol from the overcoat of
one of the men-Terry.33 Under the rubric of reasonableness, the Court
balanced the governmental interest in crime prevention and officer safety
against the individual interest in privacy, holding that an officer is
constitutionally permitted to stop and frisk a defendant whom he has
reasonable suspicion to believe is engaged in criminal activity and is armed
and dangerous.34 The Court's decision was a bold step in allowing greater
governmental intrusion into individual privacy, yet it took care to cabin the
effect of its holding by stating that the stop must be reasonable at its
inception, and that the frisk must be limited to search for weapons when the
35
suspect is reasonably believed to be armed and dangerous.
Id. at 6-7 (stating officer believed men were "casing a job, a stick-up"). At some point the
third man left the comer where the other two had been conversing, only to rejoin them in front of
one of the stores into which they had been peering. Id. at 6. Once the men rejoined in front of the
store, the detective approached the trio, identified himself as a police officer, and asked the
suspects for their names. Id. at 6-7. After the suspects mumbled incoherent responses to his
inquiries, the officer promptly grabbed Terry, turned him around, and "patted down the outside of
his clothing." Id. at 7.
34 Id. at 30-31 (authorizing investigatory stops when balancing test weighs in favor of
governmental action). The Terry Court borrowed the balancing test set forth in Camara to weigh
the governmental interest in crime prevention against the individual's interest in privacy. Id. at
20-27 (citing Camara balancing test as only "ready test" for determining reasonableness). Using
this balancing test, the Court held that an investigatory stop is permitted when a police officer is
able to identify "specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from
those facts," create a reasonable, particularized suspicion that the individual is engaged in
criminal activity. Id. at 21. In essence, the Court's definition of reasonable suspicion served to
delineate the parameters of a reasonable stop and to ensure that constitutionally guaranteed rights
of privacy were not invaded on mere "inarticulate hunches." See id. at 19-22 (stating officer's
action must be "justified at its inception"). Under this framework, the Court decided that the
officer was justified in stopping and seizing the defendant. Id. at 23. Having decided that the
officer could lawfully stop Terry, the Court recognized that it still needed to decide if, and under
what circumstances, the stop could proceed to a frisk, for the frisk entailed still another level of
intrusion upon privacy. Id. at 23-25 (recognizing protective frisk entails "severe ...intrusion
upon cherished personal security"). Once again, the Court utilized the Camarabalancing test to
weigh the governmental interest in officer safety against the individual's right to privacy, and
ultimately decided that the officer's safety warranted a limited invasion of the individual's
privacy rights. Id. (authorizing officer's action because of threat to his safety during investigatory
stop). Concluding, the Court circumscribed its holding to the particular facts presented in Terry,
averring that lower courts would need to perform a balancing analysis in each case to determine
whether the governmental interest sufficiently justifies an invasion of individual rights. Id. at 30
("Each case of this sort will, of course, have to be decided on its own facts.").
33

35 See supra text accompanying note 34 (outlining specific circumstances under which stop
of individual is permissible). Having articulated circumstances under which an officer could
lawfully stop an individual, the Court was careful to define when the stop could proceed to a
frisk. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 30-31 (creating "narrowly drawn authority" allowing reasonable
search for weapons to protect officer safety). At the same time, the Court made clear that the stop
did not necessarily authorize the frisk. See id. at 27. To proceed from a stop to a frisk, the officer
must have "reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual." Id. The
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The balancing test that the Court employed in Terry subsequently
proved to be somewhat unwieldy for lower courts, which struggled to apply
the inherently subjective analysis in ways that produced consistent,
predictable results.36 Consequently, the Court has been called upon to
explicate Terry principles in a number of subsequent cases; in so doing, it
has provided clarification of the requisite level of suspicion necessary to
conduct the stop and the frisk as well as the proper parameters of the stop
and the frisk in myriad factual circumstances.3 7 Analysis of the Court's

Court clarified this point in the following way:
The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is
whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the
belief that his safety or that of others was in danger. And in determining whether the
officer acted reasonably in such circumstances, due weight must be given, not to his
inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch,' but to the specific reasonable
inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience.
Id. Upon articulating the standards under which an officer could stop and frisk an individual, the
Court made sure to limit the scope of the frisk to search for weapons only, ensuring that officers
would not use their frisk authority to search for non-harmful contraband. See id. at 26 (stating
patdown must be "strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation"). In other
words, the frisk must be limited to "that which is necessary for the discovery of weapons which
might be used to harm the officer or others nearby." Id.
36 See United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981) (commenting on lower
courts'
inconsistent definitions of "reasonable suspicion"). See generally Rachel Karen Laser, Comment,
UnreasonableSuspicion: Relying on Refusals to Support Terry Stops, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161,
1169 (1995) (noting Court has consistently acknowledged that "reasonable suspicion" standard
not self-evident). Prominent criminal law professor Wayne LaFave observed that given the oftstated need for guidelines, one is struck with the fact that very few specific guidelines can be
distilled from Terry. See Wayne R. LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry,
Sibron, Peters, and Beyond, 67 MICH. L. REV. 39, 40 & n.3 (1968) (noting Court consciously
left itself room for later elaboration of Terry).
37 See Jamie L. Stulin, Comment, Does Hiibel Redefine Terry? The Latest Expansion of the
Terry Doctrine and the Silent Impact of Terrorism on the Supreme Court's Decision to Compel
Identification, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 1449, 1456-58 (2005) (providing cogent outline of Terry's
progeny). Since deciding Terry, the Court has considered numerous factors that may lead to the
requisite suspicion necessary to support a Terry stop. See id. at 1456-57 (outlining factors). Such
factors include a suspect's behavior. See, e.g., United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1989)
(authorizing stop of defendant whose behavior illustrated classic signs of drug courier); United
States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 564-66 (1980) (deeming stop of defendant who appeared
nervous and tried to evade police detection constitutional); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422
U.S. 873, 884-85 (1975) (listing erratic, evasive behavior as pertinent factor in establishing
reasonable suspicion). Additionally, the location of the stop is relevant to reasonable suspicion.
See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147-48 (1972) (legitimizing policeman's reasonable
suspicion due to defendant's presence in high-crime area). The Court has also identified a
suspect's race as potentially important. See Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 886-87 (holding
ancestry a factor but alone insufficient to support Terry stop). A fourth factor considered is the
credibility of an anonymous tip. See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 332 (1990) (supporting
stop of defendant based on anonymous tip); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 244-46 (1983)
(confirming anonymous tip may be sufficient to support stop). The Court has also considered the
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jurisprudence subsequent to Terry reflects several trends, the combined
effect of which has been to give police ever more leeway in their
encounters with individuals: 1) the Court has broadened the bounds of
permissible Terry stops, and generally loosened the reasonable suspicion
standard, making it easier for officers to detain individuals; 2) the Court has

made it easier to categorize an encounter as "consensual," and therefore not
subject to any Fourth Amendment regulation; and 3) the Court has

generally given officers more flexibility to take measures to ensure their
safety, including allowing pat-frisks in circumstances beyond the scope of
those considered in Terry.38
Although the Court has consistently

credibility of non-anonymous tips. See Adams, 407 U.S. at 146-47 (positing informant's tip could
supply requisite reasonable suspicion for search). Finally, the Court has weighed the interests at
stake. See Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451-55 (1990) (upholding police
sobriety checkpoint because of serious public interest and lowered expectation of privacy);
Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 618-21 (1989) (ruling public safety concerns
warrant railroad employee drug testing); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985)
(holding students accorded reduced level of protection because of state's interest in school
discipline). In addition to examining factors contributing to "reasonable suspicion" to perform a
Terry stop, the Court has also been called upon to address the scope and nature of Terry patfrisks. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 379 (1993) (permitting officer to seize
contraband immediately recognized during pat-frisk); Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 336-37
(1990) (allowing "protective sweep" of areas immediately surrounding suspect incident to arrest);
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1052-53 (1983) (upholding Terry pat-frisk of passenger
compartment of lawfully stopped vehicle); Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91, 95-96 (1979)
(disallowing pat-frisk of tavern patron merely based on proximity to suspect); Sibron v. New
York, 392 U.S. 40, 74 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring) (stating protective pat-frisk of suspect
possessing narcotics unjustified).
38 See Elizabeth Ahern Wells, Note,
Warrantless Traffic Stops: A Suspension of
ConstitutionalGuaranteesin Post September 11th America, 34 U. TOL. L. REV. 899, 899 (2003)
(observing Terry "reasonable suspicion" standard has evolved into virtual "green light for police
officers"); see also United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002) (upholding investigatory
stop of driver based on aggregate of individually innocent factors); Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7-8
(expanding "reasonable suspicion" standard to include totality of circumstances); United States v.
Simpson, 609 F.3d 1140, 1149 (10th Cir. 2010) ("[L]ies, evasions or inconsistencies about any
subject ... may contribute to reasonable suspicion."). Commentators have criticized Arvizu as
eroding the "reasonable suspicion" standard beyond recognition. See Wells, supra, at 913
(positing aggregation of innocent factors to create "reasonable suspicion" does not protect privacy
rights). Also contributing to the erosion of the "reasonable suspicion" standard is a general trend
toward treating police officers as experts and giving undue deference to their judgment. See
David A. Harris, Frisking Every Suspect: The Withering of Terry, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 34
(1994) (criticizing Court for setting standard deferring to officers' judgments); see also Ornelas v.
United States, 517 U.S. 690, 700 (1996) (deferring to police officer's experience to determine
whether reasonable suspicion present); Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418 ("[T]he evidence thus collected
must be seen and weighed not in terms of library analysis by scholars, but as understood by those
versed in the field of law enforcement."). The Court also broadened the scope of Terry stops to
include drug crimes and minor crimes, as opposed to just violent crimes. See White, 496 U.S. at
330 (allowing officers to stop driver for suspected drug offense); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S.
648, 663 (1979) (applying Terry principles to stop of driver suspected of not having license). In
addition to loosening the strictures of "reasonable suspicion" and applying Terry principles to
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more cases, the Court has also categorized more encounters as consensual, and therefore not
subject to Fourth Amendment protections. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991)
(reiterating mere police questioning does not constitute seizure); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S. 218, 249 (1973) (holding consent to search was voluntary); Tracey Maclin, "Black and Blue
Encounters" Some Preliminary Thoughts About Fourth Amendment Seizures: Should Race
Afatter?, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 243, 247-49 (1991) (arguing Court's reasonable person standard
allows it to artificially categorize more encounters as consensual). The Court has also generally
granted officers greater flexibility to ensure their own safety. See, e.g., Ryburn v. Huff, 132 S.
Ct. 987, 991 (2012) (permitting officers to enter woman's home after she declined to answer
whether guns located inside); Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 414 (1997) (allowing officers to
order innocent passengers out of car for officer safety); Pennsylvania v. Mimns, 434 U.S. 106,
112 (1977) (authorizing officer to order driver out of vehicle during traffic stop for officer safety);
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969) (allowing officers to search area where arrestee
might reach for weapons). While the Court has decided a number of cases regarding what
measures officers may take to protect their own safety, it has decided relatively fewer cases
dealing specifically with the frisk. See Hars, supra, at 14 (stating Court spoken about frisks
only few times since Terry). To the extent that the Supreme Court has weighed in, it has sent
mixed messages: it has held steadfastly that pat-frisks may only occur when the suspect is
believed to be armed and dangerous; however, it has allowed officers to satisfy that burden fairly
easily and has also, purposefully or not, encouraged frisks by allowing officers to seize nondangerous contraband that they can immediately detect during the course of a frisk. Compare
Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 91-93 (disallowing frisk of tavern patron who was merely in proximity of
suspect), and Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 74 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring) (cautioning
drugs not basis for belief that suspect was armed and dangerous), with Dickerson, 508 U.S. at
375-76 (permitting officer to seize non-harmful contraband immediately recognizable during patfrisk), and Adams, 407 U.S. at 147-48 (positing informant's tip that suspect armed, lateness of
hour, and location justified frisk). The Supreme Court has also allowed pat-frisks and other
searches and seizures in contexts where there is no suspicion of criminal conduct at all. See
Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 327, 332 (2009) (permitting pat-frisk of passenger in lawfully
stopped vehicle); Buie, 494 U.S. at 334 (sustaining warrantless protective sweep of premise
during arrest); Sitz, 496 U.S. at 451-55 (allowing police to stop vehicles at check points without
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity). Despite the Court's proclamation that frisks must be
limited to searches for weapons, and perhaps because of its general permissiveness allowing
officers to take measures to ensure their own safety, lower courts have allowed frisks
"automatically categorically in many situations in which the offense suspected does not
require a weapon, and the suspect shows no outward sign he might be armed and dangerous."
Hats, supra, at 22-23 (observing lower courts have classified certain types of offenses and
people as always dangerous). For example, lower courts have allowed pat-frisks of drug dealers,
based on the notion that drug dealers are always dangerous. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia,
459 F.3d 1059, 1064 (10th Cir. 2006) (stating frisk of drug traffickers reasonable); United States
v. Brown, 913 F.2d 570, 572 (8th Cir. 1990) (permitting frisk of drug trafficker); United States v.
Trullo, 809 F.2d 108, 113 (1st Cir. 1987) (allowing weapons frisk of major drug trafficking
suspect); United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 61-62 (2d Cir. 1977) (permitting pat-frisk based on
officer's experience that narcotics dealers use firearms as "tools of the trade"). Lower courts
have also condoned the frisking of burglary suspects on the rationale that burglars often carry
tools that might be used as weapons. See United States v. Moore, 817 F.2d 1105, 1108 (4th Cir.
1987) (condoning automatic frisk because burglary often involves use of weapons). Courts have
also allowed pat-frisks of companions of arrestees, even if the companion is not suspected of any
criminal wrongdoing. See, e.g., United States v. Cruz, 909 F.2d 422, 424 (11th Cir. 1989)
(justifying frisk of defendant because she was with "known drug dealer"); United States v.
Stevens, 509 F.2d 683, 688 (8th Cir. 1975) (upholding automatic frisk of companion in car);
United States v. Poms, 484 F.2d 919, 922 (4th Cir. 1973) (holding police may automatically frisk
all companions of arrestees within immediate vicinity of arrest). Finally, lower courts have
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broadened the applicability of Terry, and shown increased deference to
promote officer safety, it has never squarely decided the constitutionality of
pat-frisks in the specific context of consensual encounters between officers
and citizens on the street.39 As such, there has been a split of opinion
allowed pat-frisks based on the most barebones facts, evidencing a clear deference to concerns for
officer safety. See, e.g., United States v. Hats, 313 F.3d 1228, 1236 (10th Cir. 2002) (upholding
frisk of nervous and noncompliant suspect); United States v. Jackson, 300 F.3d 740, 746 (7th Cir.
2002) (upholding frisk because suspect known to be armed in the past); United States v.
Robinson, 119 F.3d 663, 667 (8th Cir. 1997) (permitting pat-frisk where defendant took hands off
steering wheel and "moved them towards his waist"); United States v. Rideau, 969 F.2d 1572,
1575 (5th Cir. 1992) (justifying frisk because defendant's "moves took place after a detention, at
night, in a high crime area"); United States v. Mitchell, 951 F.2d 1291, 1296 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
(sustaining frisk of passenger who moved both hands under coat suggesting hiding gun); United
States v. Colin, 928 F.2d 676, 678 (5th Cir. 1991) (allowing frisk of passenger who "stoop[ed]
down and mov[ed] from side to side"). Unfortunately, the effects of broad officer leeway are not
shared equally along racial lines. See Gregory Howard Williams, The Supreme Court and Broken
Promises: The Gradual but Continual Erosion of Terry v. Ohio, 34 HOW. L.J. 567, 571-73
(1991) (describing widespread abuse of warrantless searches and seizures upon AfricanAmericans).
39 See United States v. House, 463 F. App'x 783, 791 (10th Cir. 2012) (Baldock, J.,
dissenting) (stating Court never decided constitutionality of frisks during consensual encounters
with person on street). It does merit attention that the Court has come infinitely close to
addressing the precise issue of suspicionless pat-frisks during consensual encounters with citizens
on the street, but it did so in the context of car stops, which have always been treated differently
than stops on the street. See Johnson, 555 U.S. at 327, 332 (upholding pat-frisk of passenger in
lawfully stopped vehicle). The Johnson Court stated:
[I]n a traffic-stop setting, the first Terry condition a lawful investigatory stop is met
whenever it is lawful for police to detain an automobile and its occupants pending
inquiry into a vehicular violation. The police need not have, in addition, cause to
believe any occupant of the vehicle is involved in criminal activity. To justify a
patdown of the driver or a passenger during a traffic stop, however, just as in the case
of a pedestrian reasonably suspected of criminal activity, the police must harbor
reasonable suspicion that the person subjected to the frisk is armed and dangerous.
Id. at 327. The Court had previously held that officers who conduct "routine traffic stop[s]" may
"perform a 'patdown' of a driver and any passengers upon reasonable suspicion that they may be
armed and dangerous." Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 118 (1998). Although such reasoning
appears to resolve the issue of pat-frisks during consensual encounters on the street, it does not;
unlike stops on the street, during a traffic stop a police officer effectively seizes "everyone in the
vehicle," including all passengers. Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 255 (2007). As Terry
makes clear, once someone is lawfully stopped, that person may be lawfully frisked if suspected
of being armed and dangerous. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968). Furthermore, the
Johnson Court had the opportunity to specifically address the issue of pat-frisks during
consensual encounters, especially because the lower court analyzed the case in precisely those
terms, yet the Court refused to do so. Compare Johnson, 555 U.S. at 333 (stating officer's
inquiries into matters unrelated to stop do not convert encounter into consensual one), with State
v. Johnson, 170 P.3d 667, 673 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007) (concluding encounter with defendant
"evolved into a separate, consensual encounter"). In addition, the reasoning behind pat-frisking
passengers is very particular; the Court has oft-recognized that traffic stops are "especially
fraught with danger to police officers," and that the risk of violence stems from the fact that
"evidence of a more serious crime might be uncovered during the stop." See Maryland v. Wilson,
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among lower courts-some have held that reasonable suspicion of criminal
conduct is a necessary prerequisite to pat-frisk, while others have ruled that
pat-frisks based 40entirely on suspicion that a person is armed and dangerous
are permissible.
In UnitedStates v. House, the Tenth Circuit had the opportunity to
decide an important and contentious Terry issue-whether officers may
pat-frisk suspects during consensual encounters on the street in the absence
of articulable suspicion of criminal activity. 41 The court declined to decide
the issue, reasoning that it could decide the issue on other groundsnamely, that the pat-frisk was unconstitutional because there was no
evidence indicating that House was dangerous at the time of the frisk. 42
519 U.S. 408, 414 (1997) (noting risk of revealing new evidence impetus for possible violence
during traffic stop); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1047-48 (1983) (recognizing danger
inherent in traffic stops). The Court has noted that "as a practical matter, passengers are already
stopped by virtue of the stop of the vehicle" so "the additional intrusion on the passenger is
minimal." Wilson, 519 U.S. at 413-15.
40 Compare United States v. Orman, 486 F.3d 1170, 1173 (9th Cir. 2007) (stating Terry did
not "cabin the use of officer safety patdowns" to lawful investigatory stops), and United States v.
Romain, 393 F.3d 63, 75 (1st Cir. 2004) (holding officer legitimately on residential premises
pursuant to consent may frisk for safety), and United States v. Bonds, 829 F.2d 1072, 1075 (1 lth
Cir. 1987) (holding officer entitled to frisk to ensure safety absent concern of criminal activity),
with United States v. Burton, 228 F.3d 524, 527 (4th Cir. 2000) (stating reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity necessary pre-requisite to pat-frisk), and United States v. Gray, 213 F.3d 998,
1000 (8th Cir. 2000) (noting criminal activity necessary to justify pat-frisk), and Gomez v. United
States, 597 A.2d 884, 890-91 (D.C. 1991) (reasoning "legitimate safety concerns" cannot support
frisk absent suspicion of criminal activity). While a fairly even split of authority exists, the
Eighth Circuit has not been consistent in its holding that pat-frisks require lawful investigatory
stops. See United States v. Ellis, 501 F.3d 958, 961-63 (8th Cir. 2007) (upholding frisk without
identifying criminal activity as basis). Prominent criminal law professor Wayne LaFave has
stated that a lawful stop is a necessary pre-requisite to a frisk. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE 4TH AMENDMENT § 9.6(a) (Thomson
West ed., 4th ed. 2004) ("[T]he fact remains that a frisk for self-protection cannot be undertaken
when the officer has unnecessarily put himself in a position of danger by not avoiding the
individual in question."). The Tenth and Seventh Circuits have issued opinions that seem to
allow pat-frisks based solely on officer safety, yet neither court decided the issue explicitly. See
United States v. Manjarrez, 348 F.3d 881, 887-88 (10th Cir. 2003) (upholding frisk that was not
necessary to its decision because evidence resulted from consent search); United States v.
$84,000 U.S. Currency, 717 F.2d 1090, 1099 (7th Cir. 1983) (upholding pat-down of man
suspected of smuggling drugs, but who voluntarily accompanied officer in airport).
41 See House, 463 F. App'x at 784 (stating issue in case). The court found the encounter was
consensual because there was only one officer, the encounter took place on a public sidewalk in
the middle of the day, House testified that he felt "free to leave," and the officer did not demand,
but rather asked House if he could ask him a few questions. Id. at 785-86.
42 See id. at 786 (emphasizing Terry language stating frisk dependent upon suspect being
armed and dangerous). The court held that Officer Daley could reasonably conclude, based on
his observation of the folding knife and the bulge under House's jacket, that House was armed.
Id. at 788. It maintained, however, that there was no indication that House was presently
dangerous to Officer Daley or other citizens, stating that "[b]eing armed does not ineluctably
equate with dangerousness." Id.
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The court disagreed with the government's assertion that there was Tenth
Circuit precedent stating officers may pat-frisk absent suspicion that
criminal activity is afoot, but indicated that because that issue was not
material to its holding, it would assume (without deciding) that officers
43
may pat-frisk based solely on safety concerns.
The dissent countered that the majority mistakenly, and somewhat
cavalierly, decided that House did not pose a threat at the time he was
frisked.44 The dissent noted that Officer Daley reasonably deemed House a
danger to public safety, so it was forced to address the issue of whether
officers may frisk suspects in the absence of reasonable suspicion of

criminal activity. 45 To set up its argument, the dissent pointed out that the
Supreme Court simply had not addressed the issue: although Justice
Harlan's concurring opinion in Terry stated that a frisk depended upon a

valid stop, Harlan's view did not "win the day.",46 Moreover, the dissent
noted that while the Terry majority did treat the "stop and frisk" as

essentially a single transaction, it offered different rationales for the "stop"
and the "frisk"-whereas effective crime prevention and detection justified
the stop, officer safety justified the frisk.47 Thus, the dissent reasoned,
43 See id. at 786-87 (observing sister circuits divided but declining to decide issue); id. at 791
n. 1 (Baldock, J., dissenting) (acknowledging divided sister courts). The court made note of the
government's argument that 4fanjarrez, a Tenth Circuit opinion, stood for the proposition that
officers could frisk absent reasonable suspicion. Id. at 786-87. The court responded by stating
that it doubted Afanjarrez stood for that proposition, and in a corresponding footnote, more
forcefully stated that Afanjarrez did not, in fact, stand for that proposition. See id. (doubting
government's interpretation of Alanjarrez); id. at 786 n.1 (explaining search in Alanjarrez
predicated upon consent and pat-frisk "probably irrelevant").
44 See id. at 790 (Baldock, J., dissenting) (stating majority simply ignores danger posed by
Defendant's potential possession of firearm). The dissent further pointed out that House was in
the vicinity of a criminal investigation and appeared to try to avoid law enforcement. Id. The
dissent also cited the Supreme Court's Ryburn decision as supporting the proposition that
House's denial of having weapons was another circumstance contributing to the officer's fear. Id.
at 795 (comparing House's denial to woman's actions in Ryburn); see also Ryburn v. Huff, 132
S. Ct. 987, 992 (2012) (opining officers had "an objectively reasonable basis for fearing that
violence was imminent").
45 See House, 463 F. App'x at 790 (Baldock, J., dissenting) (positing majority wrong to
conclude House was not dangerous).
46 See id. at 791 (stating Supreme Court, Tenth Circuit not decided whether officer may frisk
absent suspicion of criminality); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 32-33 (1968) (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (making "perfectly clear" that right to frisk depends on right to stop). As further
evidence that Justice Harlan's view was not controlling, the dissent quoted the Terry Court's
statement that the limitations on protective frisks "'will have to be developed in the concrete
factual circumstances of individual cases."' See House, 463 F. App'x at 791 (Baldock, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 29).
47 See House, 463 F. App'x at 791 (Baldock, J., dissenting) (noting different rationales
offered by Terry Court); see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 22 (positing effective crime prevention and
detection justifies investigatory stop). Terry stated that the frisk, however, was based on the
"immediate interest of the police officer in taking steps to assure himself that the person with
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because consensual encounters still present safety concerns, officers should
be allowed to frisk to ensure their safety,
and to conduct necessary
48
investigations without fear for their lives.
Pat-frisks of citizens on the street implicate important Fourth
Amendment privacy protections, and therefore deserve close judicial
scrutiny. 49 In House, the Tenth Circuit majority had an opportunity to
clarify its position with respect to this important Terry issue, and in so
doing, could have added another voice to the circuit split that currently
exists, perhaps encouraging the Supreme Court to clarify the issue once and
for all.50 Instead, the court side-stepped the issue, finding that House did
not pose a threat to Officer Daley's safety, even though House was visibly
armed. 5'
The court's abstinence forced it to make an arguably
disingenuous decision, and more importantly, allowed the dissent to have
the last word regarding pat-frisks during consensual encounters.52
whom he is dealing is not armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used
against him." Terry, 392 U.S. at 23.
48 See House, 463 F. App'x at 791-92 (Baldock, J., dissenting) (noting frisk justified by
strong governmental safety interest and necessity of allowing officers to investigate). The dissent
notes that if officers may not frisk persons suspected to be armed and dangerous during
consensual encounters, officers are left with two nonsensical options. Id. at 793-94 (alleging
officer would either have to walk away or remain in dangerous situation). Finally, the dissent
concedes that an officer may not frisk simply any person on the street suspected of being armed,
but maintains that if an officer fears that an armed person is also dangerous, a frisk should be
allowed. Id. at 794.
49 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 24-25 (acknowledging protective frisk entails "severe, though brief,
intrusion upon cherished personal security"). The Terry Court further recognized that a pat-frisk
must "surely be an annoying, frightening, and perhaps humiliating experience." Id. at 25; see
also Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96 (1964) (noting warrantless searches "bypass[] safeguards
provided by objective predetermination of probable cause"); Harris, supra note 38, at 33-35
(opining judiciary's failure to scrutinize police testimony contributed to gross pat-frisk
expansion).
50 See House, 463 F. App'x at 791 n.1 (Baldock, J., dissenting) (remarking sister circuits split
on issue of frisks during consensual encounters); see also supra text accompanying note 43
(opining that Afanjarrez did not address issue); supra text accompanying note 38 (explaining
Supreme Court never squarely decided issue, despite coming infinitely close).
51 See House, 463 F. App'x at 786-87 (declining to address issue). Based on some Supreme
Court and lower court decisions, including Tenth Circuit decisions, there is a persuasive argument
that because House was near a reported burglary, appeared to evade officers, and then lied about
being armed, Officer Daley did have reasonable concern for his safety. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 2324 (observing guns and knives contribute to vast majority of officer deaths and injuries); see also
sources cited supra note 38 (enumerating factors considered by courts).
52 See supra text accompanying note 38 (enumerating ample precedent on which court could
find Officer Daley feared for safety); see also supra text accompanying notes 44-48 (detailing
House dissent's lengthy argument). The proposition that the court's decision was disingenuous is
bolstered by the fact that House did not argue in his brief that Officer Daley lacked reasonable
suspicion to suspect that House was armed and dangerous, ostensibly conceding the issue. See
Appellant's Reply Brief, supra note 21, at *6-*13 (arguing frisks require suspicion of criminal
activity).
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The dissent's position in House is a laudable effort to protect
officer safety; however, it is analytically unsupportable, practically
troubling, and threatens to eviscerate the privacy protections that Terry left
in place.53 Analytically, the dissent's position is indefensible because it
overlooks the fact that pat-frisks of persons are seizures, and seizures must
be predicated upon reasonable suspicion that a person has, or will soon
commit a crime-a suspicion noticeably lacking in House . The dissent's
position also has practical implications that are troubling, because courts
have consistently eroded the "armed and dangerous" aspect of Terry by
deferring to officer "expertise," thereby finding that certain people, types of
crime, and innocuous, subtle movements provide the basis of concern for
officer safety.55 Accordingly, if officers could frisk citizens during
consensual encounters, the result may be that they could legally frisk any
person on the street, especially if they are a minority, who is unfortunate
enough to have his hand in his pocket or who looks down or fidgets in the
officer's presence.5 6
Finally, the dissent's rule would discourage
cooperative, compliant behavior, as the citizen who stays to answer an
officer's questions
risks being frisked, whereas the one who simply walks
57
away does not.
The dissent's position is perhaps emblematic of the problem that
arises when the legality of searches and seizures are evaluated solely upon

53 See Harris, supra note 38, at 5 (cautioning overuse of frisks threatens to make Terry into

evidence gathering device); see also supra note 38 and accompanying text (explaining analytical
and practical problems with dissent's position).
54 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 ("[T]here can be no question, then, that Officer McFadden
'seized' petitioner ...when he took hold of him and patted down the outer surfaces of his
clothing."); Appellant's Reply Brief, supra note 21, at 6 ("[I]t is impossible to conduct afrisk
without a detention."); see also United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)
(explaining seizure of person occurs where reasonable person would not feel free to leave).
Moreover, the frisk must have as a predicate a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. See
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972) ("So long as the officer is entitled to make a
forcible stop, and has reason to believe that the suspect is armed and dangerous, he may conduct a
weapons search ....);Terry, 392 U.S. at 17-18 (noting seizure must be based on reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity at its inception).
55 See cases cited supra note 38 (outlining cases upholding pat-frisks based on officer
safety).
56 See Harris, supra note 38, at 5 (positing someday all persons stopped may have to undergo
frisk); see also cases cited supra note 38 (illustrating various innocuous behaviors that provide
officers with reasonable suspicion to conduct pat-frisks). Minorities have born the brunt of the
latitude given to police during street encounters. See Williams, supra note 38, at 567 (describing
widespread abuse of warrantless searches and seizures on street against African -Americans); see
also Terry, 392 U.S. at 14 (acknowledging existence of "wholesale harassment" of AfricanAmericans).
57 See United States v. House, 463 F. App'x 783, 786 (10th Cir. 2012) (noting House felt free
to leave but stayed because it was "right thing to do").
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reasonableness-namely, when officer safety concerns are at issue, those
interests will almost always prevail.58 To wit, since Terry, courts have
allowed officers ever more leeway to ensure their own safety when
conducting searches and seizures, often at the expense of the privacy rights
of those being investigated.5 9 While there can be no doubt that officer
safety is a weighty concern, if the Fourth Amendment is going to perform
its function of protecting individuals from arbitrary and unreasonable
invasions, the Reasonableness Clause cannot continually be used to allow
law enforcement the unfettered ability to seize and search any person they
want, especially those who are not suspected of any wrongdoing.60
Unfortunately, courts' deference to officer safety at the expense of
individual privacy is a trend that shows no signs of abating; indeed, it
seems that if the current Supreme Court were to decide the legality of patfrisks of individuals during consensual encounters on the street, it too
would likely err on the side of officer safety.61
Terry v. Ohio was a monumental decision allowing officers to stop
and frisk individuals on the street supported by less than probable cause.
While Terry struck an appropriate balance in protecting individual privacy

against governmental interests in ferreting out crime, the subsequent
decisions of both the Supreme Court and lower courts have moved the law
on stop and frisks steadily in the government's favor. Allowing frisks
based solely on officer safety would represent yet another shift in this

58

See Sundby, supra note 24, at 439 (noting balancing test naturally favors governmental

interests). Sundby points out that the governmental interests at stake saving lives, stopping the
flow of illegal narcotics, catching undocumented persons "are tangible and visible benefits that
will stand out in the balancing process." Id. By contrast, individual privacy interests are "much
less tangible and pale in comparison." Id.
59 See supra text accompanying note 38 (documenting increasing deference given to officers
during searches and seizures).
60 See Hats, supra note 38, at 5 (counseling against overuse of stop and frisk). Harris
points out that if officers are allowed to frisk at their own discretion, the "Terry stop and frisk will
become what the Supreme Court has repeatedly said and still says it never will be: a device
for gathering evidence, pure and simple." Id.; see also Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366,
379 (1993) (stating frisks may be used only to find weapons, not to gather evidence); Adams v.
Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972) (declaring frisk is not for discovering evidence of crime).
61 See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110 (1977) ("We think it too plain for
argument that the State's proffered justification the safety of the officer-is both legitimate and
weighty."); supra text accompanying note 38 (commenting on Court's increased deference to
officer safety concerns). This year, the Court stated that officers could lawfully enter the home of
a woman who, when asked whether she had weapons inside, immediately turned around and ran
into her house. See Ryburn v. Huff, 132 S. Ct. 987, 991 (2012) (upholding officer entrance based
on "imminent threat to their safety"). Interestingly, the Court made no mention of whether the
officers had probable cause or reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, but justified its decision
purely on concerns for officer safety. See id. at 991-92 (discussing only officer safety to conclude
search was permissible).
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direction, permitting officers to subject individuals not suspected of any
wrongdoing to the embarrassing and intrusive experience of a pat-frisk.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court should directly address this issue, and it
should decide that frisks of individuals on the street conducted without
suspicion of criminal activity are unlawful. In the meantime, circuit courts,
given the opportunity, should make clear that this practice cannot be
sustained.
In House, the Tenth Circuit missed precisely such an
opportunity.
David Cashman

